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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
OVERVIEW AND OPERATION OF U.S. FINANCIAL
SANCTIONS, INCLUDING THE EXAMPLE OF IRAN
BARRY E. CARTER* AND RYAN M. FARHA†
Economic sanctions have had a long history dating back to the Greek
city states.1 Their use has become more common since World War II,
often being employed by the United Nations, regional entities, and
individual countries, including the United States. Although a range of
sanctions continue to be used, financial sanctions have grown in
importance. This stems in part from the burgeoning increase in
international financial transactions. Also, the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, provided great impetus to the United States to
improve significantly the tools and techniques for tracing and identify-
ing financial transactions by terrorists or others.2
Activities that usually are possible subjects of economic sanctions3
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1. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 9 (3d ed. 2007).
2. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
3. A generally accepted working definition is “the deliberate, government-inspired with-
drawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations” for foreign policy or
national security goals. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
Economic sanctions have been used and are used to stop a country’s military adventure, to
destabilize its government, or to influence or express disapproval about a range of other foreign
policy considerations involving weapons proliferation, human rights, terrorism, drug trafficking,
or the environment. See id. at 9-17.
Although the dividing lines are not always clear and motives can be mixed, economic
sanctions are generally viewed as measures that are not taken for commercial gain and often come
at economic cost to the country imposing the sanctions. On the other hand, countries might use,
or threaten to use, economic measures against another country to obtain normal economic
objectives in trade, financial, or other negotiations. This is generally viewed as part of bargaining
and is not categorized as an economic sanction. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 5 (1988).
903
include: (a) bilateral government programs, such as foreign assistance
and aircraft landing rights; (b) exports of goods or services from the
sending country; (c) imports from the target4 country; (d) financial
transactions, including bank deposits and loans; and (e) the economic
activities of international financial institutions, such as the Inter-
American Development Bank.5
Financial sanctions focus on the flow of funds and other forms of
value to and from a target country, corporation, individual, or other
entity. These sanctions can have wide impact because they can not only
freeze financial assets and prohibit or limit financial transactions, but
they also impede trade by making it difficult to pay for the export or
import of goods and services. Financial sanctions are often used in
tandem with trade and other sanctions to maximize their impact.6
Using U.S. financial sanctions as an example, this Article tries to
highlight the mechanics and operation of financial sanctions. This
includes their enforcement, which occurs through a unique combina-
tion of (a) actions and self-reporting by U.S. and other international
financial institutions and (b) supervision by U.S. regulatory authorities.
U.S. financial sanctions are imposed by U.S. statutes7 and Executive
Orders,8 and generally implemented through regulations.9 The Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), in consultation with the U.S. Department of State
and sometimes other federal agencies, generally has primary responsi-
bility for implementing these financial sanctions.10
As a key part of its efforts, OFAC maintains the Specially Designated
4. The state or organization (e.g., the United Nations) that imposes the sanction is some-
times called the sender, and the object of the sanction is sometimes called the target. HUFBAUER
ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
5. See CARTER, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See, e.g., Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-175, § 5, 117 Stat. 2482, (2003) (prohibiting the export of certain U.S. goods to Syria);
Exec. Order 13,572, § 1, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,787 (Apr. 29, 2011) (blocking property and interests in
property that come within the United States belonging to certain Syrian persons).
7. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223,
Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2012)); United Nations Participa-
tion Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c-d) (2012).
8. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,622, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,897 (July 30, 2012) (authorizing Iran
sanctions based on IEEPA authority).
9. See 31 C.F.R. § 535 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,619, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,243 (July 11, 2012) (authorizing
sanctions against “any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or
at the recommendation of the Secretary of State” to have threatened the peace in Burma).
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Nationals and Blocked Persons list (the SDN list).11 The SDN list
contains individuals, companies, and other entities whose assets are
blocked, generally because they are owned or controlled by, or acting
for or on behalf of, sanctioned countries, or are designated under
non-country-specific programs, such as those targeting terrorists and
foreign narcotics traffickers.12 Collectively, these individuals, compa-
nies, and other entities are “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDNs).13
With certain exceptions, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from
transacting with SDNs.14 In addition, U.S. persons are generally pro-
hibited from engaging, without OFAC’s authorization, in most trans-
actions in or with certain countries or geographic areas targeted by
economic sanctions.15
I. TRANSFERRING VALUE AND THE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
To understand the mechanics and operation of financial sanctions, it
is very helpful to have some familiarity with how value is transferred and
how the key payment systems operate.
A. Transferring Value
In modern economies, value is transferred between parties via cash
or claims on banks. These claims in turn may be transferred using
checks, credit cards, or electronic funds transfers (wire transfers).16
Wire transfers are the most important kinds of payments in the
international financial system; large financial institutions and corpora-
tions mainly use wire transfers to send large volumes of funds at a high
frequency.17
Essentially, a wire transfer is a transaction in which the transferor or
“originator,” which may be an individual, a corporation, or a bank,
instructs its bank to transfer funds from its account to the account of
11. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Desig-
nated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/sdn [hereinafter
SDN List].
12. See 31 C.F.R. ch. V, app. A (2012).
13. SDN List, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 590 (18th ed. 2011).
17. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FEASIBILITY OF A
CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 55
(2006) [hereinafter FinCEN Report].
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the recipient or “beneficiary.”18 If the originator and beneficiary have
accounts at the same bank, that bank simply makes a “book transfer”
by debiting (and thus reducing the funds in) the originator’s account
and crediting (and thus increasing the funds in) the beneficiary’s
account.19
If the originator and beneficiary do not have accounts at the same
bank, but the originator’s bank and the beneficiary’s bank maintain
“correspondent accounts”20 with each other, the transfer may be
completed through one of those correspondent accounts.21
Alternatively, the originator’s bank and the beneficiary’s bank may
both maintain correspondent accounts at a third “intermediary bank,”
where the transfer will occur.22 This approach essentially requires that
the banks must retain sufficient balances in their correspondent ac-
counts and establish chains of intermediaries by which to effect funds
transfers.23
B. Key Payment Systems
1. Fedwire
These requirements are ameliorated within the United States by
Fedwire, a communication and settlement system owned by the twelve
18. See id. at 55-56.
19. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 16, at 591.
20. Under U.S. law, a “correspondent account” is an account established at a U.S. bank by a
foreign financial institution “to receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of [the] foreign
financial institution, or handle other financial transactions related to such institution.” See
31 U.S.C. § 5318A(e)(1)(B) (2006). More basically, a correspondent relationship is “the provision
of banking services by one financial institution to another financial institution.” FinCEN Report,
supra note 17, at 56. Related to correspondent accounts are “payable-through accounts,” which are
accounts established at U.S. banks by foreign financial institutions to enable foreign customers to
access the U.S. banking system. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(e)(1)(C) (2006). U.S. sanctions regulations
generally apply equally to both correspondent accounts and payable-through accounts. See, e.g.,
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195,
§ 104(c), 124 Stat. 1312, 1332-33 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (directing
Treasury to prohibit or restrict the opening of correspondent or payable-through accounts by
foreign financial institutions that have engaged in prohibited activities).
21. See FinCEN Report, supra note 17, at 56-57. In this case, upon the originator’s instruction,
the originator’s bank debits the originator’s account and credits the correspondent account of the
beneficiary’s bank. The beneficiary’s bank then credits the beneficiary’s account. See also SCOTT &
GELPERN, supra note 16, at 592.
22. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 16, at 593. Here, upon receiving the payment instruc-
tion, the intermediary bank debits the correspondent account of the originator’s bank and credits
the correspondent account of the beneficiary’s bank to undertake the transaction. See id.
23. See id. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 16, at 593-95.
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Federal Reserve Banks, where a large number of U.S. banks main-
tain correspondent accounts and where liquidity is plentiful.24 The
Federal Reserve Banks, taken together, serve the role of an inter-
mediary bank in funds transfers and actually settle payments.25 Among
the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY) plays an especially important role because the majority of
U.S. Fedwire transactions originate from financial institutions under
FRBNY’s jurisdiction.
2. CHIPS and SWIFT
Two other important payment systems are the Clearing House
Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). CHIPS, like
Fedwire, performs both communication and settlement functions.26
CHIPS is the main domestic electronic funds transfer system in the
United States for processing U.S. dollar wire transfers between interna-
tional banks and other financial institutions.27
SWIFT, unlike Fedwire and CHIPS, is just a communication system.28
SWIFT, which is based in Belgium, provides a common language—its
payment instructions—for financial institutions around the world and
is thus vital to the settlement of international payments.29 However,
SWIFT does not actually provide settlement services; that is, SWIFT-
directed funds transfers are actually settled through correspondent
banking relationships, Fedwire, CHIPS, or other national payment
systems.30
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement of financial sanctions begins in the payment systems.
It is worth noting, though, that the FRBNY, despite its role as inter-
mediary to a high volume of financial transactions, does not actually
screen electronic Fedwire transactions for OFAC compliance as the
24. See id. at 595-97.
25. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Fedwire® and National Settlement Services, http://
www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed43.html (last updated June 2009).
26. FinCEN Report, supra note 17, at 61-62.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 62-63.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 63-64.
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transactions are processed in real-time.31
Rather than real-time monitoring of transactions by the U.S. govern-
ment, the underlying mechanism of OFAC compliance is private sector
monitoring of transactions and self-reporting of actual or potential
sanctions violations by U.S. and foreign financial institutions participat-
ing in the payment systems. If a financial institution subject to U.S.
jurisdiction receives property in which an SDN has an interest (such as
a payment instruction in which either the originator or beneficiary is a
prohibited SDN), the institution must block (“freeze”) whatever prop-
erty is the subject of the payment instruction or, in some circumstances,
the institution can reject the transaction.32 The institution must then
file within ten business days a report with OFAC identifying: the owner
or account party; the property, its location, and its value; the date it was
blocked or rejected; an image of the payment instruction; and a
confirmation that the payment has been deposited into a blocked
31. From 2004 to 2006, FRBNY did implement the Fedwire Integrity Pilot Program, in which
FRBNY compared a sample list of SDNs against a four-year moving history of transactions in the
Fedwire database. Of 305 transactions identified as containing potential matches to the SDN List,
OFAC concluded that only one transaction constituted a violation and issued a cautionary letter to
the financial institution in question. OFAC officials treated the program as sensitive because its
public disclosure would lead to its termination and would damage OFAC’s relationship with the
Federal Reserve. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OIG-10-045,
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL: OFAC SHOULD HAVE BETTER AND MORE TIMELY DOCUMENTED REVIEW OF
POTENTIAL SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS, 10 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/
organizational-structure/ig/Documents/OIG10045%20%28Fedwire%29-Not%20SBU%20%282
%29.pdf.
OFAC’s concern with public disclosure of the program was likely informed by the public
outcry that arose in Europe upon the revelation of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP) by The New York Times in June 2006. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by
U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/
washington/23intel.html?_r0&pagewantedprint; Constant Brand, Belgian PM: Data Transfer
Broke Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/09/28/AR2006092800585_pf.html. Treasury initiated the TFTP after the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 to identify and track the financing of terrorism. Under the program, which is still in
place, Treasury issues subpoenas to SWIFT or other designated providers seeking information on
financial transactions by suspected terrorists. Some in Europe forcefully condemned the program
as a breach of EU privacy laws. Nevertheless, the EU approved a 2010 agreement that essentially
codifies the practices involved in the TFTP. See Agreement between the European Union and the
United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the
European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) (July 27, 2010), available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uriOJ:L:2010:195:0005:0014:EN:PDF.
32. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201-22 (2012).
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account.33 Since the mid-1990s, many financial institutions have em-
ployed as “best practice” sophisticated OFAC screening software to
strengthen their monitoring and reporting systems.34
In addition to self-reporting, illegal transactions come to light in the
course of testing of compliance procedures, internal audits, regular
on-site bank examinations, OFAC investigations, and whistle-blowing
by confidential sources.
When OFAC learns that an illegal transaction has been processed
through a U.S. financial institution without being blocked or rejected,
OFAC may send an administrative subpoena to the institution request-
ing an explanation of how the transaction was processed.35 If OFAC
determines that a violation has occurred, it may issue a cautionary
letter, impose civil penalties, or refer the matter to law enforcement
agencies for criminal prosecution.36 OFAC has imposed hundreds of
millions of dollars in civil penalties on U.S. and foreign financial
institutions and companies for failing to appropriately block or reject,
or for defrauding U.S. financial institutions into processing, illegal
transfers involving a targeted country or SDN.37
SDNs and other persons in a sanctioned country should find it
extremely difficult to engage in dollar transactions, and this inability to
transact in the world’s most important currency can be crippling. The
vast majority of cross-border dollar transactions—95%, according to
FRBNY—are settled through CHIPS,38 where such transactions will of
course be monitored by financial institutions, and held, rejected or
blocked, and reported to OFAC where necessary. Although there are a
number of payment systems outside the United States that can settle
dollar transactions (for example, HSBC’s Clearing House Automated
33. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.602-03. (2012).
34. The market for such software is robust. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#29 (Sept. 10, 2002) (“31. What are the features and benefits
that banks should be looking for when selecting an OFAC compliance software package?” “There
are a wide variety of software packages available to the financial community. The size and needs of
each institutions help to determine what to look for in a package . . . .”).
35. See Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 501, App. A, Pt. II.B
(2013).
36. See id. at II.C-F.
37. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control and HSBC Holdings plc, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121211_HSBC_Settlement.pdf (Dec. 11, 2012).
38. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CHIPS, http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/
fedpoint/fed36.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
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Transfer System), financial institutions using these systems likely em-
ploy OFAC’s SDN List in part due to fear of an additional tool in the
U.S. arsenal, Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.39
III. SECTION 311 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Section 311 directs Treasury to designate a financial institution or
jurisdiction as being of “primary money laundering concern” based on
numerous jurisdictional and institutional factors, including the extent
to which the institution is “used to facilitate or promote money launder-
ing.”40 The result of this designation is severe: the institution may be
prohibited from maintaining correspondent accounts with U.S. finan-
cial institutions,41 thereby cutting off access to U.S. dollar payment
systems and business in the United States generally.
The exercise of Section 311 can also have additional indirect conse-
quences, as demonstrated by the 2005 designation of Banco Delta Asia,
a bank in Macau, China.42 The bank allegedly conducted business with
North Korea despite U.S. sanctions against North Korea.43 Even before
Treasury had instituted a formal rule designating Banco Delta Asia as
being a primary money laundering concern, the threat of designation
alone triggered a run on the bank, which depleted 34% of deposits
within days.44 The bank went into receivership, and the Macau govern-
ment froze accounts that Treasury had identified as suspect.45 Thus,
Treasury was able to punish the alleged circumvention of sanctions,
albeit in a blunt manner.
IV. IRAN SANCTIONS AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Today, Iran is the primary target of U.S. financial sanctions. A variety
of strong overlapping U.S. sanctions have been imposed against Iran.
39. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, supra note 2, at Pub. § 311 (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 5318A).
40. See id. § 5318A(a), (c).
41. See id. § 5318A(b).
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as
Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2720.aspx; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.655
(Mar. 1, 2011).
43. Mark S. Gaylord, The Banco Delta Asia Affair: The USA PATRIOT Act and Allegations of Money
Laundering in Macau, 50 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 293, 297-98 (2008).
44. Id. at 298.
45. Id.
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The key recent components of the financial sanctions regime in place
against Iran include: (1) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Account-
ability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA);46 (2) the USA PATRIOT
Act money laundering designation of 2011;47 (3) the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA);48 (4) the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA);49 and (5) the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2013, which included the Iran Freedom
and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCPA).50 In contrast, the Trade Sanc-
tions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) provides
an exception from these sanctions for certain licensed U.S. sales of
food, medicine, and medical supplies to Iran (among other target
countries).51
As a result of the laws and regulations in place even before the 2013
IFCPA, the very broad sanctions against Iran meant that it was practi-
cally impossible for U.S. financial institutions or other U.S. persons to
engage in transactions with almost any Iranian bank (or non-bank SDN
in Iran).52
At the end of 2012, many U.S. sanctions against Iran, including
financial ones, were extended significantly by amending a regulation
pursuant to the 2012 ITRA statute. That regulation prohibits entities
“owned or controlled by a United States person and established or
maintained outside the United States” from knowingly engaging in any
transaction, directly or indirectly, with the Government of Iran or any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, if that
transaction would be prohibited if done by a U.S. person or in the
United States.53 In short, subject to some exceptions, the activities of a
46. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a
Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Iran311Finding.pdf.
48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1245,
125 Stat. 1298, 1647-50 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
49. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158,
126 Stat. 1214 (2012).
50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 1241-55,
126 Stat. 1632, 2004-18 (2013) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 880).
51. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387,
§ 904(2), 114 Stat. 1549A-67 (2000).
52. See Clif Burns, Bye Bye, TSRA?, EXPORTLAWBLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 6:34 PM), http://www.
exportlawblog.com/archives/3793.
53. See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.215 (2013). An
in-depth discussion of the various U.S. sanctions laws and regulations against Iran is beyond the
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foreign subsidiary or other entity controlled by a U.S. person were
covered the same way as if the U.S. person did them. This extension of
jurisdiction is similar to a U.S. law and regulations that extend the
reach of U.S. sanctions against Cuba to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations.
The new IFCPA of 2013 continues to expand the scope of U.S.
sanctions to prescribe even more rules regarding financial transactions
by financial institutions and other persons and entities within the
United States and elsewhere. The Act imposes penalties on the violator
by limiting its ability to do business in the United States, restricting U.S.
persons’ interactions with the violator, or directly targeting the violator
or its assets when under U.S. jurisdiction.54
For example, IFCPA Section 1244 requires, with some exceptions,
that “the President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose
strict conditions on the maintaining of a correspondent account or a
payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the
President determines knowingly . . . conducts or facilitates a significant
financial transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer to and from Iran of
goods or services” that are “used in connection with the energy,
shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran.”55 Similar language to cover
other activities that a foreign financial institution might knowingly
conduct or facilitate is used in Sections 1245 (sale or supply of certain
materials to or from Iran),56 1246 (providing insurance or underwrit-
ing for sanctioned activities or persons),57 and 1247 (facilitating finan-
cial transactions by SDNs).58
In Sections 1244-46, besides prohibiting or limiting strictly a foreign
bank’s access to a correspondent account or a payable-through account
in the United States, the law also provides that, for certain activities, the
President is required to impose five or more of the penalties outlined
by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended.59 The list of
twelve possible penalties includes, among others: a prohibition on U.S.
scope of this introductory Article. For such a discussion, see, for example, Meredith Rathbone,
Peter Jeydel & Amy Lentz, Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging a Path Through Complex Transna-
tional Sanctions Laws (2013), in this issue.
54. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239,
§§ 1245-49, 126 Stat. 1632 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 8804-07).
55. Id. § 1244(d)(2)-(3).
56. See id. § 1245(c)-(d).
57. See id. § 1246(a).
58. See id. § 1247(a)-(b).
59. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)).
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persons investing in or purchasing significant quantities of equity or
debt; a prohibition on the U.S. government contracting with a sanc-
tioned person; a prohibition on any transfers of credit or payments
between financial institutions to the extent that the transfers or pay-
ments are both subject to U.S. jurisdiction and involved any interest of
the sanctioned person; and a prohibition on most transactions with
respect to any property (within U.S. jurisdiction) in which the sanc-
tioned person has an interest.60
As illustrated by the present U.S. sanctions against Iran, financial
sanctions can prescribe rules for a wide range of activities by financial
institutions and other persons and entities around the world. Enforce-
ment can be by a variety of measures where the United States has
jurisdiction—for example, where the sanctioned entity might seek to
undertake activities within the United States, because the sanctioned
entity or its assets are within the United States, or because U.S. persons
are involved in the activities.
60. See id. See also Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act Signed Into Law, SNR DENTON
(Jan. 15, 2013). http://http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2013/january/15/iran-
freedom-and-counterproliferation-act-signed-into-law.
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